Review of Singer: Animal Liberation (second edition)

10 I grapple with this surprisingly complex issue in
"Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status" (manuscript
under review).

A Response to
David DeGrazia

11 He does, however, sometimes use them. See, e.g., AL,
228 and 229.

Peter Singer

12 For an attempted refutation of extreme anti-intuitionism,
see my Interests, Intuition, and Moral Status (a 1989
Georgetown University dissertation), ch. 3.

Monash University
My first reaction, on reading David DeGrazia's
review of the second edition of Animal Liberation,
was to applaud, He has located the strengths and
weaknesses of the book with a rare precision. If his
praise is too generous, I shall leave it to others to take
him to task over that. To me, it is particularly pleasing
because it is not the praise of an uncritical admirer.
Nor did my urge to applaud fade away when I turned
to the final, most critical, section of the review, for
here I found DeGrazia's criticisms do indeed point to
aspects of the book's argument that are, at best,
incompletely developed.
DeGrazia is right to say that some of his criticisms
go more deeply into philosophical theory than I wanted
to do in AL. When I came to write the second edition, I
knew that there was now a mass of sophisticated
philosophical literature on the topic that had not existed
when I wrote the fIrst edition. At fIrst I planned to respond
to it, but I soon realized that if I were to do so, I would be
writing a different, and much less readable, book. That
was something I did not want to do. I vaguely intend to
write a comprehensive "reply to my critics" on some
future occasion; meanwhile other projects fill my time,
projects more stimulating and, I think, more fruitful than
the tedious prospect of exposing the flaws in a volley of
objections, some of which are of interest only insofar as
they provide evidence of the lengths to which intelligent
people with philosophical training can go in order to avoid
the need to change their diet.
I do not, however, include in the scope of that last
sentence the difficulties to which DeGrazia points in
the final part of his review. The matters to which he

13 R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and
Point (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981).

14 "Reasoning towards Universalizability," in Douglas
Seanor and N. Fotion, oos., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral
Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 147. Actually, in this
article Singer suggests that Hare's case needs some
supplemental reasoning, which he attempts to provide. In doing
so, he notes that "placing a restriction on universalizability does
not seem to involve an inconsistency in any strict logical sense"
(p. 157) (see discussion of the "sui generis view" above); he
thinks instead that such a restriction is arbitrary. While he
imagines a counter to the charge of arbitrariness (pp. 158-159),
the interlocutor is not very resourceful. In any event, Singer's
supplemental argumentation cannot save Hare's theory if the
latter fails for other reasons, as I (and most other moral
philosophers) think.
15 For some

weighty arguments against Hare's view, see R.

B. Brandt, "Act-Utilitarianism and Metaethics,"Thomas Nagel,
'The Foundations of Impartiality," and Bernard Williams, 'The
Structure of Hare's Theory," in Hare and Critics.
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humans beyond the fact that they are human, no
satisfactory defence of this claim could limit itself to
this fact. DeGrazia is tentative about this. His
hesitations might be overcome if he were to consider
that the notion of what it is to be "human" is neither
transparent nor uncontroversial, as we can see when
we look at discussions of the status of the human
embryo, of anencephalic humans, and of those whose
brains have irreversibly ceased to function, either as
a whole or in those sections responsible for
consciousness. When the proponents of what
DeGrazia calls the "sui generis view" are forced to
come clean on what they mean by "human," their case
begins to unravel. If, in the end, they come down to
mere membership of the species Homo sapiens, they
should be asked whether the discovery that green-eyed
people are in fact a different species (though in every
aspect of their mental and emotional lives just like
humans) would mean that green-eyed people are not
entitled to the same consideration as the rest of us.
There is, of course, no knockdown logical objection
to saying that, in that hypothetical situation, we would
indeed be entitled to treat green-eyed people with less
consideration than others. But now the arbitrariness
of the species boundary is so glaring that no one will
find such an answer convincing.
In objecting to my failure to explain what equal
consideration comes to, DeGrazia makes one minor
error that should be corrected. After quoting my view
that it is not arbitrary to hold that different lives many
have different values, he adds: "I assume this means
that the life of a normal adult human and that of a mouse
are not to be given equal consideration, for if one must
choose between them, one should, on this view, save
the human." The conclusion is right, but the fIrst part
of the assumption is loosely put; one should give the
mouse and the human equal consideration (that is, the
scales by which one compares what the human gets out
of life and what the mouse gets out of life should be
impartial), but the upshot of that equal consideration
will be, I suggest, that we value the life of the normal
human more highly than that of the mouse, because
from an impartial perspective, the normal human does
have more to lose. So there is no question of "what
determines whether two interests, or sets of interests,
are identical or sufficiently similar that equal
consideration applies to them." As I indicated in
Practical Ethics (p. 92, although not quite in these
words), I should be willing to give equal consideration

refers are of real philosophical interest and are central
to my approach to the ethics of our relations with
animals. So I shall try to say something about them.
First, DeGrazia presents a challenge to the principle
of equal consideration of interests which he refers to as
"the argument from social bondedness." My response
to this challenge, as presented by Mary Midgley and
more recently by Jeffrey Gray,! is indeed the one
DeGrazia describes as "Singerian." This DeGrazia
suggests is not good enough, because "many clearthinking philosophers" will not be satisfied by it. Like
W. D. Ross, they will think that the nature of the
relationship of the parent and child in itself justifies
preferential treatment, and any overall benefits are
fortuitous.
I don't think that these philosophers have thought
clearly enough. If they had, they would have discarded
the kind of ethical intuitionism espoused by Ross,
because they would have realized that our intuitions
are not a reliable guide to what we, as reflective
reasoning beings, can justify. After all, for most of
human history almost all males (and probably even
most females) have thought that the nature of the
relationship of the husband and wife, in itself, requires
. obedience on the part of the wife. And as recently as
the turn of the century, Hastings Rashdall, one of the
most distinguished British philosophers of his day,
thought that the self-evident wrongness of sexual
permissiveness was a decisive objection to any form
of hedonistic utilitarianism?
When we look at the specific relationship to which
Midgley and DeGrazia refer-the relationship between
parent and child-it is true that there are very strong
natural feelings associated with this relationship. That
is, of course, why it is so much better that parents should
normally be responsible for the welfare of their own
children: Their natural feelings will lead them to fulfill
the task far better than any impersonal system of social
welfare. But if we allow strong natural feelings to be a
sufficient basis for the derivation of moral rights and
obligations, we will be in serious trouble, as even a
cursory glance at race relations in many different
countries will show.
The second challenge, the view that being human
just is a morally relevant characteristic, is logically
troubling. DeGrazia gets it exactly right, however,
when he says that although a defence of the claim that
humans deserve greater consideration than animals is
not logically required to refer to any traits about
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issue my differences with DeGrazia do, as he indicates,
reflect our different views about the status of moral
intuitions, and ultimately, about the basis of ethics.
Since that topic continues to challenge me, I hope,
eventually, to have more to say on it. But that will
have to wait.

to the lives of the weeds I pull out of my garden. It is
just that when I do so, and put myself in their place,
using the best available knowledge about what it is like
to be a weed pulled out of a garden, I decide that the
life of the weed is a complete blank; it has no
experiences, and so has nothing to lose. Equal
consideration of my interest in growing tomatoes and
the weed's "interest" in living, is perfectly appropriate,
but since it reveals that the weed has no interest in living,
it will always favor my interest in growing tomatoes.
I hope that I am not here using a linguistic device
to avoid a substantive objection. If, as I suspect,
DeGrazia is here raising, in less than entirely precise
language, the point that it is very difficult to compare
different interests across species, and hence very
difficult to determine when one interest is or is not
equal to another, I can only agree. But we just have to
try our best, in much the same way that, when choosing
within our own family, we have to try our best to
determine when one child's interest in going to the
beach is or is not equal to another child's interest in
visiting the new skateboard ramp.
If this is not the place for DeGrazia to review the
many objections made to act-utilitarianism, it is
certainly not the place for me to defend it. I think, in
hindsight, that-given my aim of writing AL so that it
could be accepted by people with a wide variety of
ethical views-I should have been more cautious in
my phrasing of the passage on p. 85 which DeGrazia
quotes as establishing "fairly clearly" my actutilitarianism. To the objection that an experiment on
a single animal might save many lives, it would have
been enough to present my opponents with a choice:
either they accept that in those circumstances it would
also be right to perform the experiment on a braindamaged human, or they deny that it is justifiable to
perform the experiment on any sentient third party,
human or nonhuman.
The underlying ethical issue still remains: What
should we think of utilitarianism in general, and of
act-utilitarianism in particular? Since I accept much
of what R. M. Hare says about the distinction between
everyday moral thinking and the level of critical
reflection on morality (see his Moral Thinking ),3 I am
not sure if I should be regarded as an act-utilitarian. I
originally accepted that label because I knew that I
was not a rule-utilitarian; now, fortunately, utilitarians
have a number of interesting options from which to
choose. I remain, however, a utilitarian, and on that
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Notes
1 See Jeffrey A. Gray, "On the morality of speciesism"
and Peter Singer, "Speciesism. morality and biology: a
response to Gray," The Psychologist (May, 1991).
2 Hastings Rashdall. The Theory ofGood and Evil, vol. I
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 197.

3 R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981), Pt. 1.
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